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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is proper in the Utah Court of Appeals
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellants have raised four issues on appeal:
I.

Whether the district court's dismissal of Plaintiffs'

action is within its discretion when Plaintiffs moved for and
received a continuance over the objections of Defendants, had
notice of the dates of trial, and failed to appear at the trial.
A trial court's dismissal of an action with prejudice for
failure to prosecute is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Rohan
v. Boseman, 2002 UT App. 109, 31 15, 46 P.3d 753.
II.

Whether the district court's denial of a motion to set

aside under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was
within its discretion.
A trial court's denial of a motion to set aside is reviewed
for abuse of discretion. Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 1 54,
150 P.3d 480.
III. Whether the district court's denial of Plaintiffs'
motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure was within its discretion.
A trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Smith v. Fairfax Realty, 2003
UT 41, f 25, 82 P.3d 1064.

IV.

Whether the district court's award of attorney fees

based on its inherent powers was within its discretion.
A trial court's award of attorney fees is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. S_ee Rohan, 2002 UT 109, at 1 34-35.
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes,
ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpretation is
determinative of or of central importance to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal stems from an action filed by Plaintiffs
claiming damages against Defendants for negligence and
conversion of Plaintiffs' property (R. at 1-13). The complaint
was filed on March 3, 2006. The parties completed their initial
pleadings and a Rule 26 scheduling order was entered by the
district court on May 31, 2006 (R. at 49-50). The order set a
fact discovery deadline of November 6, 2006 (R. at 50). This
date was later extended to February 28, 2007 (R. at 217, 22325).
As part of their discovery, Defendant John Siddoway's
counsel, Randy Ludlow sought to depose Plaintiff Lonnie Paulos
and his assistant and agent, Rhonda Jones (R. at 226-27, 22829). Plaintiffs moved for a protective order against these
depositions, claiming that Plaintiffs' counsel, Richard Nemelka,
had a conflict and that the deposition should be conducted
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telephonically because both witnesses relocated to Houston,
Texas during the pendency of the action (R. at 230-34). Mr.
Ludlow responded that the original dates had been set up with
Mr. Nemelka previous to the notices of deposition being filed
and that Mr. Nemelka was already informed that a telephonic
deposition would be unacceptable (R. at 235-37). Plaintiffs7
motion was set for hearing on March 19, 2007 (R.249-51).
Plaintiffs sought to continue the hearing (R. at 252-53), but
the district court held the hearing as scheduled. Mr. Nemelka
failed to appear at that hearing or to send anyone in his place
(R. at 274). Plaintiffs' motion was denied and Lonnie Paulos was
ordered to appear in Salt Lake City for a deposition and to
produce Rhonda Jones as well (R. at 274, 283-85). Plaintiffs
moved to set the order aside (R. at 279-80) but their motion was
denied (R. at 281-82) .
Meanwhile, Defendant All My Sons moved for summary judgment
on January 10, 2007 (R. at 173-75). Plaintiffs, over a month
after their response was due, filed for an extension of time to
file their memorandum in opposition, citing the fact that the
depositions of Lonnie Paulos and Rhonda Jones, which they sought
to get a protective order against, had not yet been conducted
(R. at 254-55). Plaintiffs finally filed their memorandum in
opposition on May 15, 2007 (R. at 290-313) .

The matter came before the district court for a scheduling
conference, and there the court determined based on the
representation of the parties that the trial would take three
days. (R. at t). 1 The number of witnesses and amount of evidence
that the parties proposed to offer also supported the conclusion
that a three-day trial was required (R. at t, 336-37).
Therefore, the court set the trial for October 15, 16, and 17,
2008 (R. at t, 336-37). On June 27, Plaintiffs moved to continue
the trial dates, as Mr. Nemelka was scheduled to play golf at
the Utah Senior Games in St. George during the time of trial (R.
at 345-46). Defendant All My Sons submitted a written opposition
to this motion, arguing that postponing the date of trial would
prejudice them in a separate case pending between All My Sons

1.

Plaintiffs have failed to obtain the transcript of the

scheduling conference of June 18, 2007 and the hearing of August
20, 2007. Because of this failure, and because Rule 11(e) (2) of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure do not obligate Defendants
to correct this failure, Defendants are forced to rely on their
own recollections of what occurred at the hearing. References to
occurrences taking place at that hearing will be marked with the
dagger symbol (t). Secondary references to the hearing contained
in other portions of the record will also be referred to when
available.
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and its former shareholders that was contingent on the outcome
of the present action (R. at 362-65, 541-50).
Plaintiffs' motion to continue was heard by the district
court on August 20, 2008. The court confirmed that three days
would be needed for trial (R. at t). Mr. Ludlow opposed
Plaintiffs' motion at that time, as the next available date for
trial was during a conference in Chicago involving Mr. Ludlow's
wife that Mr. Ludlow planned to attend, and that the next date
that the court had available for trial would be in 2008. (R. at
t, 643-44). Mr. Ludlow informed the Court that continuing the
trial into 2008 was not acceptable under numerous issues, and he
dropped his objection and agreed to forego the conference when
Mr. Nemelka indicated that Plaintiffs would not oppose
continuing the trial until 2008 (R. at t, 477, 644). The
district court granted Plaintiffs' motion and continued the
trial to November 5, 6, and 7, 2007 (R. at 375) . All counsel
were at the hearing, and the dates were agreed to by all parties
in open court (R. at t, 375). Defendant All My Sons' counsel,
Stephen Spencer, made a statement on the record after the
court's decision that it was important to Defendant that no
further continuances should be granted, as putting on
Defendant's evidence at the trial would require the service of
several subpoenas to persons who had no incentive to be there

and would not be easily persuaded to accommodate their schedules
more than once (R. at t, 552).
Both parties prepared for trial. Mr. Nemelka sent a trial
subpoena to Jerry Erkelens (R. at 422), and successfully moved
for the admission of Rhonda Jones' deposition into evidence in
lieu of her testimony (R. at 483-84). Mr. Ludlow sent a trial
subpoena to Judy Hicks (R. at 419). Mr. Spencer sent trial
subpoenas to Officers Aaron Jones and Mike Obrey (R. at 379,
381, 385), Rob Herrera (R. at 389), Marko Mufioz (R. at 394),
Alfredo Villegas Munoz (R. at 402), and Hector Pineda (R. at
407) .
Apparently, Mr. Nemelka misremembered the date of trial.
Mr. Nemelka calendared the dates of trial as November 6, 7, and
8, 2007 (R. at 478) , rather than the actual Gates of November 5,
6, and 7, 2007. He also told his client that the trial was on
the incorrect dates (R. at 480, 492, 522). Mr. Nemelka further
filed a proposed order admitting a deposition in lieu of witness
testimony that contained the incorrect dates and was later
signed by the district court (R. at 483-84). Plaintiffs' trial
subpoena also indicated that the witness should appear on
November 6, 2008 (R. at 422).
Defendants also submitted several documents that indicated
the dates of trial. Defendant John Siddoway's subpoena indicated
that the witness should appear November 5, 6, and 7, 2007 (R. at

6

419). Defendant All My Sons subpoenas indicated that the
witnesses would be required on November 6 and 7, 2007, as they
were not needed during the presentation of Plaintiffs' case-inchief (R. at 379, 381, 385, 389, 394, 402, 407). On November 2,
Mr. Spencer hand-delivered a copy of Defendant's Trial Brief to
Mr. Nemelka, which listed the dates of trial as November 5, 6,
and 7 (R. at 430, 537) .
Mr. Spencer and Mr. Nemelka also had a conversation
regarding the dates of trial. On October 31, 2007, Mr. Spencer
called Mr. Nemelka to inquire as to jury instructions (R. at
479, 537). During that conversation, Mr. Spencer indicated that
the trial began Monday the 5th, and Mr. Nemelka responded that
trial began Tuesday the 6th (R. at 479, 537). Mr. Spencer
confirmed the date on XChange and telephoned Mr. Nemelka's
office to tell him that he was mistaken as to the dates, and
left a message with Mr. Nemelka's receptionist to that effect
(R. at 537). Meanwhile, Mr. Nemelka contacted the district court
to inquire as to whether the trial was set for a jury, but did
not inquire as to the date of trial (R. at 479-80). Mr. Spencer,
when he hand-delivered his trial brief to Mr. Nemelka on
November 2, 2007, told Mr. Nemelka that the trial was to
commence on November 5, 2007 and that he should check the trial
date (R. at 537).

On the morning of November 5, 2001,

Mr. Ludlow, Mr.

Siddoway, and Mr. Spencer were at the court (R. at 673). Neither
Mr. Nemelka nor Plaintiffs were in attendance (R. at 673). The
district court attempted to locate Mr. Nemelka and discovered
that Mr. Nemelka was trying a case in Bountiful (R. at 673). Mr.
Ludlow and Mr. Spencer noted that they had both spent
considerable time and money preparing for trial (R. at 673), and
they moved that the court dismiss the action and award attorney
fees, which the court granted (R. at 446, 469-71, 673). The
written order dismissing the action and awarding attorney fees
upon affidavit was entered as per Rule 58A on November 7, 2007
(R. at 469-71). Defendants filed an affidavit of costs and
attorney fees (R. at 454-68, 499-511), and judgment was entered
against Plaintiffs on January 9, 2008 (R. at 584-86, 597-89) .
Plaintiffs filed a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the order
of dismissal and the award for attorney fees on November 8, 2007
(R. at 474-75). The court entered a minute entry denying this
motion on January 7, 2008 (R. at 582-83) and entered an order as
per Rule 58A on January 30, 2008, which found that (1)
Plaintiffs failed to show that they exercised reasonable care in
ascertaining the trial date, (2) the award of attorney fees was
justified under the authority of the court to control
proceedings in front of it, and (3) that the attorney fees were
reasonable charges for necessary work (R. at 637-39).
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Plaintiffs filed another post-trial motion, this time a
motion for new trial under Rule 59, on January 11, 2008 (R. at
594-95). The pleading contained virtually identical arguments to
Plaintiffs' previous motion to set aside (Compare R. at 514-20
with R. at 596-615). Plaintiffs also moved to stay enforcement
of the judgment (R. at 590-91). The court again denied
Plaintiffs' motion, entering a ruling as per Rule 58A on
February 26, 2008 (R.642-47). In that ruling, the court
explained that because Mr. Nemelka was at the hearing where the
date of trial was set, other parties had made significant
sacrifices to accommodate Mr. Nemelka's schedule, Mr. Spencer
had informed him personally of the date of trial, and that the
trial could not have been reasonably rescheduled, there was no
irregularity of proceedings or abuse of discretion that would
satisfy the requirements of Rule 59 (R. at 642-47). Plaintiffs
filed a notice of appeal on February 29, 2008 (R. at 659-60) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs' appeal fails for three reasons: this court
lacks jurisdiction, Plaintiffs have failed to marshal the
evidence, and the trial court was within its discretion. Three
of Plaintiffs' four issues on appeal are not properly before the
Court because Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial was a
successive post-judgment motion that did not toll the time to
appeal under the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Also,

9

Plaintiffs have failed to marshal the evidence supporting the
trial court's orders. The failure of the appealing party to
marshal the evidence means that a trial court must conclude that
the trial court's orders are supported by substantial evidence
and not an abuse of discretion. Finally, the trial court acted
within its discretion in all of its orders. Plaintiffs' conduct
in pursuing the litigation manifested delay and reckless
scheduling practices, as well as a lack of reasonable care in
ascertaining the correct date for trial. Balanced against
prejudice to Defendants, it is clear that the trial court was
within its discretion in dismissing the action, denying
Plaintiffs' motions, and awarding attorney fees.
ARGUMENT
1.

THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE APPEALS OF THE
LOWER COURT'S ORDER DISMISSING THE ACTION, THE DENIAL OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AND THE AWARD OF
ATTORNEY FEES; THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS THE APPEAL OF THESE
ISSUES.
Defendants ask the Court to dismiss issues I, III, and IV

for lack of jurisdiction.2 Under the Utah Rules of Appellate

2.

Defendants note that they filed a motion for summary

disposition with substantially similar arguments on April 1,
2008. While the Court denied Defendant's motion in an order
dated April 15, 2008, the order provided no analysis for why the
motion was denied. Defendants submit that the most likely reason

10

Procedure, an order may only be appealed if it is a final order,
Utah R. App. P. 3, and if a notice of appeal is filed within
thirty days of the date of the order. Utah R. App. P. 4. The
appellate court has no jurisdiction to review an order that has
not been timely appealed. Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth., 2000 UT
App. 299, SI 7, 13 P. 3d 616. A subsequent appealable order is
separate and does not give the court jurisdiction to decide the
merits of previous final orders. See Franklin Covey Client Sales
v. Melvin, 2000 UT App. 110, 519, 2 P. 3d 451 (holding that an
appeal on a denial of a motion to set aside under 60(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not give the court
jurisdiction to reach the merits of the underlying judgment).
The time for a judgment that includes attorney fees and
costs runs from the day a judgment for a sum certain has been
entered. Promax Development Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, SI15, 998
P. 2d 254. Therefore, an appeal from the order of dismissal and

for the denial was that the motion purported to dispose of less
than all the issues appealed by Plaintiff, and so would be
formally insufficient under Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. At any rate, the denial does not appear to
analyze the merits of Defendants' motion, and so the
jurisdiction of issues I, III, and IV should be reviewed by this
Court.
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the judgments for attorney fees and costs must have been filed
by February 8, 2008, unless the time was tolled by the
appropriate filing of one of five post-judgment motions: a Rule
24 or 59 motion for a new trial, a 50(b) motion for judgment, a
rule 59 motion to amend the judgment, or a Rule 52 motion to
amend or make additional findings of fact. Utah R. App. P. 4(b).
If this motion is improperly brought, it does not toll the time
for appeal. Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah
1987).
Plaintiffs' Rule 59 motion was an improper second postjudgment motion and so does not toll the time for filing an
appeal under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Once a post-judgment motion has been filed and decided by the
trial court, a second post-judgment motion for relief is
improper and so does not toll the time for appeal. Arnica Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 969 (Utah App. 1989). This
is a well-settled rule, recognized by federal and state courts.
See, e.g., Venable v. Haislip, 721 F.2d 297, 299 (10th Cir.
1983); Bank Trust Co. v. Griffin, 963 So. 2d 106, 109 (Ala.
2007); Wenzoski v. Central Banking System, Inc., 736 P.2d 753
(Cal. 1987); Sears v. Sears, 422 N.E.2d 610, 612 (111. App.
1981); Mollett v. Trustmark Ins. Co., 134 S.W.3d 621, 623 (Ky.
Ct. App. 2003); State ex rel. Douglas v. Bible Baptist Church of
Lincoln, 353 N.W.2d 20 (Neb. 1984); Kaufman v. Oregonian Pub.
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Co. , 245 P.2d 237 (Or. 1952); Elam v. South Carolina Dept. of
Transp. , 602 S.E.2d 772 (S.C. 2004); Gassaway v. Patty, 604
S.W.2d 60 (Tenn. App. Ct. 1980).
In this case, Plaintiffs filed a 60 (b) motion to set aside
the judgment on November 8, 2007. The filing and denial of this
motion prevented any successive post-judgment motions from
tolling the time for appeal. Thus, the Rule 59 motion for a new
trial or to amend the judgment did not toll the time for appeal;
the deadline for filing a notice of appeal challenging the order
of November 7, 2007 and the judgment for attorney fees and costs
that was entered by the Court clerk on January 9, 2008 was
February 8, 2008.3
Plaintiffs have argued previously that the rule against
successive post-judgment motions does not apply to this case
because Plaintiffs' 60(b) motion was filed before the judgment
date of January 8, 2008. This argument misses the point of the
rule. The purpose of the rule against successive post-judgment
motions is to promote the finality of judgments and to force a
litigant to present all of its arguments at once. Watkiss &

3

A motion to set aside the order under Rule 60(b) does not toll

the time for filing an appeal. Utah R. App. P. 4(b); Watkiss &
Campbell v. FOA & SON, 808 P.2d 1061, 1068 (Utah 1991) (Stewart,
J., Dissenting).

Campbell v. FOA & Sons, 808 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1991); Maverik
Country Stores v. Industrial Commission, 860 P.2d 944, 951 nn.
9-10 (Utah App. 1993); Arnica, 768 P.2d at 969. There is no basis
for allowing a litigant to engage in tactics after the decision
but before the entry of judgment when those same tactics are
prohibited after the entry of judgment. There is nothing about a
written entry under Rule 58A that would change the policy basis
behind the rule. Under Plaintiffs' interpretation, any litigant
could make two motions for relief from the judgment so long as
they file one of them before the written entry of judgment.
Allowing for jurisdiction in this case would open a gaping
loophole in the policy against successive post-judgment motions.
Also, Plaintiffs' argument is incorrect on its facts;
Plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) motion was filed subsequent to judgment
in this case. Plaintiffs' 60(b) motion was filed after the order
of November 7, 2007, which was a judgment for purposes of Rule
54. An order is final and appealable if the order determines the
substantive rights of the parties and terminates the litigation.
Code v. Utah Dept. of Health, 2006 UT App. 113, 13, 133 P.3d
438; Harris v. IES Assocs., 2003 UT App. 112, 156, 69 P.3d 297.
The order of November 7 struck the pleadings of the Plaintiffs,
dismissed the action with prejudice, and ordered Plaintiffs to
pay Defendants' attorney's fees. The order was therefore a final
determination of the substantive rights of the parties and a
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declaration of the endpoint of the litigation. While the
effective date of the judgment is January 9 for reasons of
judicial economy, see Promax, 2000 UT 4, at 5115, it is obvious
that Plaintiffs could have appealed from the order of November
7. Hence, the 60(b) motion filed November 8 is a post-judgment
motion.
Third, whether a motion is a post-judgment motion is
determined by the relief requested, not by the time at which the
motion was filed. A post-judgment motion, of which Rule 59 and
60(b) are two classic examples, seeks relief from a final
judgment or order of the court. Black's Law Dictionary does not
define a post-judgment motion, but defines its synonym, posttrial motion, as a u[g]eneric term to describe those motions
which are permitted after trial such as motion for new trial and
motion for relief from judgment." Black's Law Dictionary 809
(Abr. 6th ed. 1991). Thus, even if Rule 60(b) were read to allow
motions to set aside an interlocutory order (as Plaintiffs have
suggested in the past), Plaintiffs' 60(b) motion does not ask
for that type of relief. Plaintiffs sought relief not from an
interlocutory order, but from an order disposing of the
litigation. Whether that order was filed before or after the
judgment for attorney fees was entered, the motion is a postjudgment motion in nature.

Fourth, attempting to distinguish this case from Arnica by
saying the motions were made under different rules of civil
procedure also fails to apprehend the policy behind the rule
prohibiting successive post-judgment motions. A party must bring
forward all of its claims for relief at once. As this Court has
noted in a different context, a party is ''entitled to ^one bite
of the apple' . . . .

That opportunity cannot be expanded into a

multi-course buffet by such devices as reconsiderations or
supplemental filings after a motion for review has been
denied . . . ." Ring v. Industrial Commission, 744 P.2d 602, 604
(Utah App. 1987).
Finally, the law-of-the-case doctrine would independently
defeat jurisdiction in this case. The law-of-the-case doctrine
dictates that the parties should avoid relitigating the same
proposition in the same case. Richardson v. Grand Central Corp.,
572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977). A motion that seeks to relitigate
a proposition already ruled upon by the same court is improper.
Arnica, 768 P.2d at 969. In the present case, Plaintiffs' motion
for a new trial is nearly identical in substance to its motion
to set aside the judgment. Both motions rest mainly on one
argument: that the acts of Plaintiffs' Attorney were reasonable
and an
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honest mistake" (compare Plaintiffs' Memorandum in

Support of its Motion for New Trial 153-8 (R.597-602), with
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Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Set Aside
5SI6-8 (R.516-17) .4
Plaintiffs clearly had an opportunity to make any and all
arguments attacking the judgment. That they failed to do so is
not grounds for making these arguments later. This is clearly a
case where Plaintiffs' successive post-judgment motions have
NN

unjustif iably prolong [ed] the life of a lawsuit." Arnica, 768

P.2d at 969. Plaintiffs' Rule 59 motion is therefore improper,
meaning it did not toll the time for appeal, and the ruling
denying it should not be reviewable. This Court should dismiss
the Plaintiffs' appeals of the order to dismiss, the denial of

4.

To the extent there are other arguments in the Rule 59

motion that are not in the Rule 60(b) motion, it is further
proof that Plaintiffs should have brought a motion for a new
trial in the first instance. The grounds for relief are much
broader in a Rule 59 motion than in a Rule 60(b), likely broad
enough to encompass any basis for relief under Rule 60(b).
Hence, the two rules work in tandem: a motion for new trial can
offer relief for a broad range of reasons; however, it is only
available for ten days after the entry of the judgment. Rule
60(b) allows relief for fewer reasons, but it is available for
three months after the judgment or even longer, depending on the
grounds for setting aside the judgment.

the motion for a new trial, and the award of attorney fees for
lack of jurisdiction.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE LOWER COURT'S ORDER DISMISSING
THE ACTION, THE DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO SET ASIDE,
THE DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, AND THE
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO
MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S
RULING.
Plaintiffs have failed to marshal the evidence supporting

the trial court's ruling as required by Rule 24(a)(9) of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 24(a)(9) requires that
"a party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all
record evidence that supports the challenged finding." This
standard applies not only to an explicit finding of fact, but
also to the review of a fact-sensitive determination of a lower
court that is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United Park v.
Stichting Mayflower, 2006 UT 35, 1 25, 140 P.3d 1200; Chen v.
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 1 20, 100 P.3d 1177. To properly marshal
the evidence, a party is required to
"temporarily remove its own prejudices and fully
embrace the adversary's position"; he or she must play
the "devil's advocate." In so doing, appellants must
present the evidence in a light most favorable to the
trial court and not attempt to construe the evidence
in a light favorable to their case.
Chen, 2004 UT 82, at 1 78. If a party fails to marshal the
evidence, the appellate court assumes that the evidence supports
the trial court's findings and has grounds to affirm the trial
court's findings on that basis. Id. at 1 80.

1 Q

Plaintiffs' brief does not meet this requirement with
respect to any of the issues it appeals. Plaintiffs' brief does
not attempt to list the facts underlying the lower court's
orders. Plaintiffs' brief does not even include the orders it
appeals from, as required by Rule 24(a)(11)(C).
Plaintiffs have also failed to request the transcript for
the hearing of August 20, 2007, in spite of referring to this
hearing several times in its brief. An appellant is responsible
to obtain all transcripts that are relevant to a fact-intensive
determination by a lower court. Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2). The
failure of an appellant to request these transcripts leaves the
Court with no choice but to conclude that the record supports
the lower court's determination. See Horton v. Gem State Mut. of
Utah, 794 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah App. 1990).
These omissions leave Defendants and the Court
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to bear the

expense and time of performing the critical task of marshaling
the evidence. This is unfair, inefficient, and unacceptable."
United Park, 2006 UT 35, at 26. This Court should therefore rely
on Plaintiffs' failure to marshal to affirm the lower court's
rulings. Because of this unfairness, the Court should also award
Defendants' reasonable attorney fees for failure to adequately
brief as per State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App. 170, 72 P.3d 138.
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING
THE ACTION, DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO SET ASIDE,

1 Q

DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, OR IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY FEES.

A.

The trial court's dismissal of the action and its
denial of the motion for a new trial was within
its
discretion.

The trial court's dismissal for failure to prosecute is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Rohan, 2002 UT 109 at SI 28. In
addition, the guestion of whether the denial of Plaintiffs'
motion for a new trial constituted abuse of discretion is
reviewed by looking at whether the order that the Plaintiffs
sought to retry under rule 59 constituted an abuse of discretion
itself. See Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 429-30 (Utah 1999)
Defendants will therefore examine these issues in tandem.
A court has wide discretion to dismiss an action for
failure to prosecute "if a party fails to move forward according
to the rules and the directions of the court, without
justifiable excuse." Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W.
Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 878-79 (Utah 1975). "The
party challenging the dismissal bears the burden of offering a
reasonable excuse for his or her lack of diligence."' Rohan, 2002
UT 109 at 528. In reviewing whether the trial court has abused
its discretion in dismissing an action for failure to prosecute,
the appellate court should consider the following factors: (1)
the conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity each party has
had to move the case forward; (3) what each of the parties has
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done to move the case forward; (4) what difficulty or prejudice
may have been caused to the other side; and (5) most important,
whether injustice may result from the dismissal." Id.
Under these factors, the trial court was well within its
discretion to order an involuntary dismissal for failure to
prosecute. In looking at factors 1 through 3, the court could
reasonably conclude that the Plaintiffs' conduct to this point
justified the dismissal. Plaintiffs' failure to appear at trial
the morning of November 5 was due to a lack of diligence on
their part and not reasonable under the circumstances.

NN

Due

Diligence" has been described as "the prudence and effort that
is ordinarily used by a reasonable person under the
circumstances." West's Legal Thesaurus & Dictionary 261 (1985).
Plaintiffs' conduct does not meet that standard. Mr. Nemelka was
at the proceedings the day the trial date was set. He had access
to the docket and court calendar via the internet. Mr. Nemelka
was actually told by Mr. Spencer that trial started on the 5th.
Mr. Nemelka received Mr. Spencer's Trial Brief on November 2,
2007. Mr. Nemelka admits that he was told by Stephen Spencer
that the trial was scheduled November 5-7. Upon being put on
notice that he is mistaken about the date of a trial, a
reasonable attorney would double-check the calendar.
Additionally, Mr. Spencer called Mr. Nemelka's office to confirm
that the trial began on November 5, and confirmed it in writing
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through his trial brief, handed to Mr. Nemelka on November 2.
Under the circumstances, the reasonable person or attorney would
conclude that he should question and then verify his
recollection. Plaintiffs failed to act with due diligence and
therefore they had no justifiable excuse for missing the trial.
When looked at in the context of the entire proceedings,
Plaintiffs' failure to appear at the morning of November 5
becomes all the more inexcusable. Plaintiffs' conduct during the
course of the pre-trial proceedings could reasonably be
interpreted as a pattern of delay, obstruction, and reckless
scheduling practices. Mr. Nemelka originally agreed to a date
for the depositions of Mr. Paulos and Ms. Jones, then sought to
change the date because he had another appointment. Mr. Nemelka
scheduled a hearing to stop the depositions from moving forward,
then moved to continue that hearing because of a scheduling
conflict. When the court failed to grant the continuance, rather
than send someone in his place, Mr. Nemelka simply failed to
show up. Meanwhile, Plaintiffs delayed their response to
Defendants' motion for summary judgment because the depositions
of Mr. Paulos and Ms. Jones, which they had sought to quash, had
not yet taken place. In the context of Plaintiffs' multiple
delays, failures to appear, and multiple double bookings of
their schedule, the failure to appear at trial may have been the
point at which the trial court concluded that by not dismissing
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the case would constitute a failure of the court to manage the
proceedings of the court and prejudice to the Defendants.
Moreover, Plaintiffs' failure to appear and previous delays
cannot be laid at the feet of Defendants. Defendants attempted
to obtain the depositions of Mr. Paulos and Ms. Jones before the
discovery cutoff date. While there was confusion due to a change
of counsel and two separate attorneys for Defendants each
pursuing their own strategies, Defendants sought through
dispositive motions and motions for trial dates to move the
proceedings along. That is to be expected because Defendants had
the most to lose from the delay, as explained below. Mr. Spencer
declared on the record during the hearing of August 20 that any
further delay would prejudice his client's ability to put on its
case.

Mr. Ludlow sacrificed his trip to Chicago to avoid

further delay. Defendants acted with diligence in putting this
case to trial.
As to the fourth factor, it is clear that Defendants would
have suffered prejudice if the court had acquiesced in allowing
Plaintiffs to set another trial date. Defendants have incurred
considerable expense in defending this action. Plaintiffs caused
delay in failing to complete discovery prior to the original
discovery cut-off; by moving for a continuance of the original
trial date in October 2007 over Defendants' opposition; and by
failing to appear at the trial as scheduled on November 5, 2007.

Allowing the trial to go forward would have required Defendants
to subpoena all trial witnesses again. As was explained by Mr.
Spencer in the hearing of August 20, Defendants may not be able
to locate all of their witnesses a second time. Another trial
scheduling would require more trial preparation to again review
the file and numerous deposition transcripts at length and in
detail. Finally, and most importantly, there is a suit involving
Defendant All My Sons that depends on the outcome in this case.
Further delay not only prejudices that Defendant in the present
action, but also in the Delaware action.
Finally, the question of whether injustice would result in
the dismissal of the action is an equitable determination of
whether a party whose case is dismissed

XN

had ample opportunity

to litigate his case but abused such opportunity."' Rohan, 2002
UT 109 at 132; see also Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237, 240
(Utah App. 1989) (concluding that the litigant
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had ample

opportunity" to litigate his case, but abused the judicial
process and so the dismissal was justified). As in the
aforementioned cases, Plaintiffs, had they exercised reasonable
care in determining the trial dates, would have had their
opportunity to litigate their case. The court had accommodated
their schedule several times with impunity. But for Plaintiffs'
inability to adhere to the schedule of the court, they would
have been able to litigate their case. The review of the factors
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shows that the trial court was within its discretion in
dismissing the action.
Plaintiffs make several arguments in their brief as to why
the motion to dismiss was an abuse of discretion. Defendants
will discuss each one in the following paragraphs, citing to
their location within Plaintiffs' opening brief.
Plaintiffs argue that the clients reasonably relied on the
representations of Mr. Nemelka and thus exercised reasonable
care in ascertaining the date of trial (Pis. Br. 20-21, 34-35).
They further argue that the clients are not responsible for what
their counsel did or did not do (Pis. Br. 21-22), and that the
trial court's sanctions would punish the clients rather than the
attorney (pis. br. 31-32). This argument is without basis in
law. An attorney is an agent of the client, and the attorney's
lack of diligence is imputed to the client. Walker v. Carlson,
740 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Utah App. 1987); see also Russell v.
Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984); Gardiner & Gardiner
Builders v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429, 430 (Utah 1982); Von Hake v.
Thomas, 858 P.2d 193, 194 n.3 (Utah App. 1993); Deschamps v.
Pulley, 784 P.2d 471, 474 n.2 (Utah App. 1989). Whether the
clients were diligent is not the determinative issue of this
appeal; the issue is whether Mr. Nemelka exercised reasonable
care and due diligence in ascertaining the dates of trial such
that his mistake was reasonable. Also, clients get punished for
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the negligence of their attorneys all the time. There is also a
remedy for the clients in this circumstance—a malpractice
lawsuit.
Plaintiffs argue that they were justified in relying on an
order, drafted by Plaintiffs' counsel and signed by the Court
that included the incorrect dates for trial (Pis. Br. 21, 25,
33-34). First, Mr. Nemelka does not claim that he actually
relied upon this order. The record evidence seems to indicate
that he did not. Second, because the date was not material to
the order and thus cannot be construed as a ratification or
endorsement of Mr. Nemelka's mistake. As the court said in its
ruling (R.644), the order was not a scheduling order and did not
actually cause confusion. Finally, the order cannot be construed
as an argument for estoppel as Plaintiffs' counsel wrote the
order himself. Plaintiffs are trying to claim detrimental
reliance on what were essentially his counsel's own words, and
take advantage of a mistake that Plaintiffs invited the court to
make. To allow Plaintiffs to do this is contrary to the law. Cf.
Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, 51 14-24, 164 P.3d 366 (Explaining
the invited error doctrine). At most, this is evidence that
Plaintiffs and their counsel were honestly mistaken about the
date, an argument that Plaintiffs raise in their brief (Pis. Br.
22, 23, 30). However, the relevant question is not whether they
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were honestly mistaken, but whether they were reasonably
mistaken.
Plaintiffs argue that because the trial subpoenas sent by
Defendant were for the dates of November 6 & 7, 2007, it is
therefore reasonable for Plaintiffs to conclude that the trial
was to begin on November 6 (Pis. Br. 23, 25). Defendant All My
Sons subpoenaed witnesses for those dates because it anticipated
that Plaintiffs' case-in-chief would fill the first day. If Mr.
Nemelka actually relied upon Defendant's Subpoenas in
determining the actual dates of the trial, he should have been
equally curious as to why the Defendant only listed that the
trial lasted two days. The dates on the subpoenas should have
raised doubts as to Plaintiffs' recollection rather than
placating those doubts. In addition, Mr. Ludlow's subpoenas
should have raised further doubts as to whether Mr. Nemelka
remembered the trial dates correctly, as he subpoenad a witness
for November 5, 6, and 7.
Plaintiffs argue that their mistake in the calendaring was
there for Defendants and the Court to see and that no one
explicitly informed them that they were mistaken (Pis. Br. 2325, 35). This argument implies that the other parties had a duty
to .discover Plaintiffs' mistake and correct it for them. That
conclusion is without foundation and absurd. Plaintiffs never
claim that the Court or another party affirmatively
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misrepresented the date of the trial. Plaintiffs do not claim
that they conducted any research regarding the date or asked a
direct question about the date. Plaintiffs do not claim that a
method of ascertaining the correct date was unavailable or even
inconvenient. Plaintiffs affirm in the record below that Mr.
Spencer actually informed Mr. Nemelka that he may have been
mistaken about the dates. Additionally, if Plaintiffs are
arguing that each document where the incorrect date was used
should have brought Plaintiffs' mistaken belief to the notice of
the court and other parties, then it is at least equally true
that every instance where the correct date was used on the
pleadings (such as the subpoenas submitted by Mr. Ludlow and the
trial brief submitted by Mr. Spencer) was an instance that
Plaintiffs were put on notice that they were mistaken about the
correct dates. Since no other party had a duty to discover
Plaintiffs' mistaken belief and Plaintiffs had a duty to act
with due diligence in discovering the date, this is just further
reason why Plaintiffs did not act with due diligence.
Plaintiffs' argument regarding professional courtesy is
also unavailing (Pis. Br. 25-27). As explained above,
Plaintiffs' failure to appear on November 5 was not a one-time
event, but rather a larger pattern of recklessness in
scheduling. While an attorney should "cooperate in making any
reasonable adjustments" for a party's failure to appear once
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because of a scheduling mistake, Utah Code Jud. Admin. 14-301
(15), when it happens again and again, adjustments for that
party's schedule are no longer reasonable, and a reasonable
court or opposing counsel should no longer tolerate the delay.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the appropriate remedy for
their failure to appear was to conduct the trial in two days
(pis. br. 22, 27-30), and that the introduction of deposition
testimony rather than actual testimony would make it possible
for a trial to be conducted in two days (pis. br. 28).
Plaintiffs do not explain how they come to this conclusion, in
light of the fact that there would have been at least 12
witnesses proposed to testify. The introduction of two
depositions in lieu of testimony would still not likely allow
the trial to be finished in two days. Certainly the lower court
did not think so, and there is no evidence offered by Plaintiffs
that would contradict the trial court's discretion on this
point. It is highly unlikely that the trial would have been able
to finish in two days without prejudice to Defendants, and
therefore, the trial court acted within its discretion in
dismissing the action.

B.

The trial court's denial of the motion to set
was within its
discretion.

aside

The trial court was also within its discretion in denying
Plaintiffs' motion to set aside the order of dismissal under

60(b)(1). The Utah Supreme Court has referred to the provisions
of 60(b)(1) as ''unintentional conduct," Fisher v. Bybee, 2004 UT
92, f 12, 104 P.3d 1198, and applied to all of them the same
standard: "if the attorney exercised 'due diLigence' defined as
conduct that is consistent with the manner in which a reasonably
prudent attorney under similar circumstances would have acted, a
judgment may be set aside under 60(b)(1)," Menzies, 2006 UT 81
at 9[ 72; see also Airkem Intermountam, Inc. v. Parker, 513 P.2d
429, 431 (1973) (To demonstrate that the default was due to
excusable neglect, "[t]he movant must show that he has used due
diligence and that he was prevented from appearing by
circumstances over which he had no control."); State v.
Wulffenstem, 560 P.2d 331, 335 (Utah 1977) ("For

[the Supreme

Court of Utah] to deem the refusal of the lower court to vacate
a valid judgment an abuse of discretion, pub]ic policy demands
more than a mere statement that a person did not have his day in
court when full opportunity for a fair hearing was afforded to
him."). Also, in exercising its discretion to grant or deny a
motion to set aside, a district court should "balance the
equities on a case-by-case basis, including such considerations
as the preference to allow the presentation of all claims and
defenses, any delay or unfairness of a party's conduct, the need
for finality of judgments, and the respective hardships in
denying or granting relief." Katz v. Pierce, 732 P. 2d 92, 93
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n.2 (Utah 1986); See Russell v. Martell, 681 P. 2d 1193; Boyce
v. Boyce, 609 P. 2d at 931; Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P. 2d
741 (Utah 1953).5
As was shown previously, Plaintiffs' mistake did not
constitute excusable neglect because they did not exercise due
diligence. Mr. Nemelka did nothing to confirm the correct dates
of trial, even when put on notice by Mr. Spencer. Mr. Nemelka
was not presented with any circumstance over which he had no
control but rather chose to ignore the fact that he had again
over-scheduled himself. Mr. Nemelka then ignored the information
furnished to him by Mr. Spencer and failed to make reasonable
inquiry about the trial schedule. In addition, Defendants would

5.

The rationale for this rule is given m

Boyce:

The difficulty facing the trial court upon a motion to
vacate the judgment lies in the fact that a compromise
between two valid considerations must be selected. A
rule which would permit the re-opening of cases
previously decided because of error or ignorance
during the progress of the trial would in a large
measure vitiate the effects of res judicata and create
a hardship to the successful litigant m causing him
to prosecute his action more than once . . . ; on the
other hand, the court is anxious to protect the losing
party who has not had the opportunity to present his
claim or defense. Discretion must be exercised in
furtherance of justice and the court will incline
toward granting relief m a doubtful case to the end
that the party may have a hearing. However, the movant
must show that he has used due diligence and that he
was prevented from appearing by circumstances over
which he had no control.
Boyce, 609 P.2d at 931.

have suffered prejudice by setting aside the order, as was
illustrated above. The trial court was well within its
discretion in denying the motion to set aside.

C.

The award for attorney
court's
discretion.

fees

was within

the

trial

It is well established that district courts have the
inherent power to impose sanctions upon a parties or attorneys
who u by their conduct thwart the court's scheduling and movement
of cases through the court." Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d
243, 249 (Utah 1993); See Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 UT 78,

n

12-14, 985 P.2d 255. This power is pursuant to the statutory
authority given to courts to control proceedings before them.
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-2-201 & -218. A court awarding these
sanctions must make findings of fact that the nature of
Plaintiffs' conduct warranted the sanction, that the legal
services performed by the Defendants were necessary, that the
time devoted to the service was reasonable, and that the hourly
rate charged was reasonable. Griffith, 1999 UT 78 at ! 14.
The conduct exhibited by Plaintiffs' counsel justifies
entering a default judgment and awarding attorney's fees to the
Defendants. Plaintiffs' conduct shows a clear disregard for the
schedule of the court and recklessness in conducting the
litigation. As illustrated above, Plaintiffs' lack of due
diligence in ascertaining the correct trial date, along with
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their delay-causing conduct before trial, including failure to
appear at their own hearings, repeated motions for continuance,
and obstructionist tactics in discovery, justify the award of
attorney fees for the whole of the litigation. While the Court
could merely reschedule the trial and award costs and attorney's
fees for the Defendants' preparation for trial, it would not
fully compensate the Defendants for the prejudice suffered by
the multiple delays, nor would it adequately sanction Plaintiffs
for the multiple delays and recklessness in conducting the
litigation to this point. The court's original award is an
adequate measure to make the Defendants whole and is well within
the Court's discretion.
Plaintiffs argue that awarding attorney fees for the
entirety of the action constituted an error of law (pis. br. 37,
40). However, Plaintiffs cite no case law to support this
conclusion. In addition, Plaintiffs admit to the power of the
court to award fees under its inherent authority. What
Plaintiffs are contesting is not whether the court has the
authority to award attorney fees, but whether the court has the
authority to award the amount of fees that it did. That is a
question of the lower court's discretion, not a question of law.
Also, Defendants assert that the trial court's inherent power to
award attorney fees is co-extensive with a trial court's motion
to dismiss under Rule 41(d). Compare Barnard, 855 P.2d at 249

(NN[c] courts of general jurisdiction . . . , possess certain
inherent power to impose monetary sanctions on attorneys who by
their conduct thwart the court's scheduling and movement of
cases through the court"), with Maxfield, 779 P.2d at 239 ([The
authority

to dismiss an action for want of prosecution] is an

"inherent power" governed not by rule or statute but by the
control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs
so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of
cases."). If the lower court has inherent authority to entirely
dismiss an action entirely, then it must have the authority to
award attorney fees for the entirety of that action.
Plaintiffs also argue that the attorney fees were not
supported by findings (pis. br. 38) and that there was
specifically no finding of bad faith. A court awarding attorney
fees under its inherent powers must make findings of fact that
the nature of Plaintiffs' conduct warranted the sanction, that
the legal services performed by the Defendants were necessary,
that the time devoted to the service was reasonable, and that
the hourly rate charged was reasonable. Griffith, 1999 UT 78 at
SI 14. This was done in the order denying Plaintiffs' motion to
set aside (R. at 637-39). No finding of bad faith is necessary
to award attorney fees under the court's inherent power.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the amount of the award was
excessive Pis. Br. 38). However, they give no record evidence
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that would support that conclusion, nor do they marshal the
evidence that would support the conclusion. The court does not
have sufficient evidence to review this question. Also, as
argued above, Defendants were harmed not only by Plaintiffs'
failure to appear, but also by their recklessness throughout the
course of the litigation. There is sufficient evidence in the
record for the trial court to believe this, and so it is within
the discretion of the trial court to award fees for the entirety
of the litigation.
CONCLUSION
This court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal of the
dismissal of the action, the denial of Plaintiffs' motion for a
new trial, or the award of attorney fees. In addition, the
Plaintiffs have failed to marshal or to provide an adequate
record on appeal, so this Court must accept the conclusions of
the trial court as correct. Finally, the record evidence shows
that the trial court was within its discretion in dismissing the
action, denying Plaintiffs' motions to set aside and for a new
trial, and the award of attorney fees. This court should affirm
the judgment of the trial court and award Defendants their
reasonable attorney fees for Plaintiffs' failure to adequately
brief the issues on appeal.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of July, 2008.

m

Natman Whittaker
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
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ADDENDUM

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

Randy S. Ludlow #20II
Attorney for Defendant,
Jon Siddovvay, dba S & B Storage
185 South State Street. Suite 208
Salt Lake City, Utah 841II
Telephone: (801)531-1300
Fax'(801) 328-0173

NOV 0 7 2007
SALT LAKE COUNTY
B

y.
Deputy Clerk V

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LONNIE PAULOS and ADVANCED
ORTHOPEDICS and SPORTS MEDICINE
LLC. a Utah Corporation,

ORDER From TRIAL
(November 5, 2007)

Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 060903698
Judge Stephen L. Henxiod

ALL MY SONS MOVING AND
STORAGE, business entity, JOHN DOE,
doing business as All My Sons Moving and
Storage, and S & B STORAGE, a business
entity, and JOHN SIDDOWAY, doing
business as S & B Storage, and JOHN
DOES J -10,
Defendant.

The above entitled matter came on for trial before the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod,
Judge of the above entitled Court on the 5"' day of November, 2007. Neither plaintiffs nor their
counsel, Richard Ncmelka, were present. Randy S. Ludlow was present on behalf of the
defendant, Jon Siddoway, who was present, and Stephen Spencer was present on behalf of the
SIDDOWA V .1 - Oiclei liom Tnal (Novcmbei 5 2007)
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defendant, All My Sons Moving and Storage. The Court had attempted to locate the plaintiffs'
counsel, Richard Nemelka, and was informed thai he was in Bountiful, Utah, attending to
another matter. The Court had previously rescheduled the trial in order to accommodate the
request of Mr. Nemelka to attend an event in St. George, Utah. All counsel were personally
present in Court when the matter was scheduled for the trial to be held November 5-7, 2007 and
all counsel had agreed to the date and time for trial. Mr. Stephen Spencer had represented to the
Court thai he personally had contacted Mr. Nemelka's office to make sure that Mr. Nemelka
would know that the trial was to commence on November 5, 2007 and further had informed Mr.
Nemelka of the trial date when Mr. Nemelka was hand-delivered a copy of Mr. Spencer's Trial
Brief. The Court records clearly reflect that the appropriate date was given in the Court Notice.
The Court having found that the defendants have had to prepare for a three-day trial, which has
caused them, and to the Court, a significant inconvenience as well as a waste of Court and
attorney resources; the defendants have continuously alleged that this matter was without merit
and have requested attorneys' fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-56, which the
Court deems appropriate, given the history of this action; further, the Court deems as further
appropriate that the sanctions to be entered in this matter are to include all attorneys' fees and
costs as have been incurred by the defendants in this matter;
Now, based upon the above and good cause appearing herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The Plaintiffs' pleadings are stricken and their claims against the Defendants are

dismissed with prejudice.
2.

The Defendants are awarded their costs and attorneys' fees as judgment against
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the PlamliHs,jointly and severally, upon submission ofan affidavit and corresponding Order for
the same.
ENTERED this 7 day of ^CfVtU/jyz^

, 2007.
BY THE COURT;
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CERTIFJCATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify on the £>

clay of November, 2007, a true and correct copy was

mailed in the United Stales Mail, postage prepaid, of the foregoing ORDER From TRIAL
(November 5, 2007) to the following:
RICHARD S. NEMELKA
STEPHEN R. NEMELKA
6806 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

Stephen D. Spencer
45 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107

SHARLA J. WEAVER
Legal Assistant
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Randy S. Ludlow #2011
Attorney foi Defendant,
Jon Siddoway, dba S & B Storage
185 South Stale Street. Suite 208
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)531-1300
Fax:(801)328-0173

l.D

FRK
ENTERED IN REGISTRY
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LONN1E PAULOS and ADVANCED
ORTHOPEDICS and SPORTS MEDICINE
LLC, a Utah Corporation,

JUDGEMENT
(on behalf of Jon Siddoway)

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Case No. 060903698
Judge Stephen L. Henriod

ALL MY SONS MOVING AND
STORAGE, business entity, JOHN DOE,
doing business as All My Sons Moving and
Storage, and S & B STORAGE, a business
entity, and JON SIDDOWAY, doing
business as S & B Storage, and JOHN
DOES 1-10,
Defendants.

The above entitled matter came on for trial before the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod,
Judge of the above entitled Court on the 5lh day of November, 2007. Neither plaintiffs nor their
counsel. Richard Nemelka. were present. Randy S. Ludlow was present on behalf of the
defendant, Jon Siddoway, who was present, and Stephen Spencer was present on behalf of the
Judgment (on behalf of Jon Siddoway) @J
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defendant, All My Sons Moving and Sloiage The Courl having found that the defendants have
had to piepare foi a thiec-day trial, which has caused them, and to the Court a significant
inconvenience as well as a waste of Courl and attorney lesouices, the defendants have
continuously alleged thai this mallei was without menl and have iequestcd attorneys* kes
ptiisuanl to Utah Code Ann Section 78-27-56, which the Court deems appropriate, given the
history of this action, (urthei, the Courl having determined also thai the sanctions to be entered
in this mallei aic to include all attorneys' fees and costs as have been inclined by the defendants
in this matter, the Courl having levicwed the Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs as
submitted by Randy S Ludlow and having found thai the same arc reasonable, just, and within
the community standard foi like work and services;
Now, based upon the above and good cause appearing herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS.
1.

The Defendant. Jon Siddoway dba as S & B Storage is awarded judgement

against the Plaintiffs, Lonnie Paulos and Advanced Orthopedic and Sports Medicine LLC.
jointly and severally, foi his attorney's kts incurred by him in this matter in the amount of
$11,31400
2.

The Defendant, Jon Siddoway dba as S & B Storage is also awarded his costs

/
/

/

(Intentionally left blank)

/
/
/
SIDDOWAY

I - Increment (on behalf of Ion Sicidow.iy)
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mcuned by him against (he Plaintiffs, Lonnic Paulos and Advanced Orthopedic and Sports
Medicine LLC, jointly and severally, in the amount of $738 41
ENTERED this ^ d a y o

20(
BY THE COURT
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&

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I heieby certify on the

day oi Novembei, 2007, a tine and correct copy was

mailed in the United States Mail, postage picpaid, ofthe foregoing JUDGEMENT (on behalf of
Jon Siddoway) to the following.
RICHARD S. NEMELKA
STEPHEN R NEMELKA
6806 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Stephen D. Spencer
45 East Vine Stieet
Murray, Utah 84107

SHARLA J. WEAVER
Legal Assistant
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Stephen D.Spencer (8913)
D A Y SHELL & LILJENQUIST, L.C.

Attorney for Defendant (All My Sons Moving and Storage)
45 East Vine Street
Murray, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-6800
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

LONNIE PAULOS and ADVANCED
ORTHOPEDICS and SPORTS MEDICINE
LLC, a Utah Corporation,
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JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
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ENTERED IN RFG^TRV
OF JUDGMENT^

v.

DATE.

ALL MY SONS MOVING AND STORAGE,
a business entity, JOHN DOE, doing business
as All My Sons Moving and Storage, and
S & B STORAGE, a business entity, and
JOHN SIDDOWAY, doing business as S & B
Storage, and JOHN DOES 1-10
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THIS MATTER came for a bench trial on November 5, 2007, the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod
presiding, whereupon Plaintiffs' complaint was stricken and attorney's fees and costs were awarded to
defendant All My Sons Moving and Storage as more fully set forth in the Order arising from that date.
The Court, having ordered that defendant All My Sons Moving and Storage should be awarded its
attorney's fees and costs; having reviewed the Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs provided by
counsel for All My Sons Moving and Storage; and having held that the attorney's fees and costs are
reasonable under the circumstances, hereby enters JUDGMENT against the Plaintiffs as follows

CO
O)
(D
CO
CD

O)

o
o

CD

1.

Defendant All My Sons Moving and Storage is granted JUDGMENT in the amount of

$16,973.60 against the Plaintiffs, jointly and severally, including: Lonnie Paulos; Advanced
Orthopedics; and Utah Sports Medicine LLC.
2.

Defendant All My Sons Moving and Storage shall file a partial or complete satisfaction

of judgment as provided by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure upon payment or collection of amounts
owed.

DONE this

"5

\OMUiA^
day of ^OMU^^

20^

BY THE COURT:

Third District Court Judged ^
SEAL:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am an employee or partner of Day Shell & Liljenquist L.C. and that I
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT, to the following:
Richard R. Nemelka
NEMELKA & NEMELKA
6806 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Randy S. Ludlow
185 S. State St. #208
SLC,UT84111
Court; client
ON this _ S _ day of November, 2007.
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Nathan Whittaker/^^ 7
Paralegal for Stephen D. Spencer
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Stephen D. Spencer (8913)
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST,

L.C.

Attorney for Defendant (All My Sons Moving and Storage)
45 East Vine Street
Murray, UT 84107
Telephone: (801)262-6800
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

LONNIE PAULOS and ADVANCED
ORTHOPEDICS and SPORTS MEDICINE
LLC, a Utah Corporation,

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO SET ASIDE DISMISSAL AND
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO
ATTORNEY'S FEES

Plaintiff,
v.
ALL MY SONS MOVING AND STORAGE,
a business entity, JOHN DOE, doing business
as All My Sons Moving and Storage, and
S & B STORAGE, a business entity, and
JOHN SIDDOWAY, doing business as S & B
Storage, and JOHN DOES 1-10

Cases No. 060903698

Judge Stephen L. Henriod
Defendants.

IN THIS MATTER, Plaintiffs have filed a Rule 60(b) Motion to set aside the Court's Order of
Dismissal signed November 7, 2006. Plaintiffs also object to the attorney's fees submitted by counsel
for Defendant S&B Storage. The parties have submitted supporting and opposing memoranda and
properly noticed the matter pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court, having
reviewed the motion and the file in this matter, hereby makes findings and orders as follows:
1.

<\

Plaintiffs have failed to show that they exercised dric diligence in ascertaining the trial

date such that the order dismissing their complaint should be set aside under Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah
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Rules of Civil Procedure, nor have they pleaded facts sufficient to set aside the order dismissing the
complaint under any other subsection of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs'
motion is therefore DENIED.
2.

It is just and reasonable to award attorney's fees pursuant to this Court's authority to

control proceedings before it under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-7-5 & -17, to compensate Defendants for
Plaintiffs' umltipla delays-aafegcklra&ndPfrm conducting this litigation.
3.

The legal services performed by the Defendants were necessary, and the time devoted to

the services and the hourly rate charged were reasonable.
4.

Plaintiffs' objection to Defendant S&B Storage's attorney's fees fails to articulate a

reason for their objection and therefore is OVERRULED.
DATED this ^ b _ day of'\^u^_^

2008.
^

BY THE COURT:

iL^
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am an employee or partner of Day Shell & Liljenquist L.C. and that I
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to be placed in the United States Mail, first
class, postage prepaid, to the following:
Richard R. Nemelka
NEMELKA & NEMELKA
6806 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Randy S. Ludlow
185 S. State St. #208
SLC,UT84111
Court; client
ON this _/^_ day of January, 2008.

s~\
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JfMn

Nathan Whittaker
^-^
Paralegal to Stephen D. Spencer
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FJLEE DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

FEB 2 6 2008
SALT LAKE COUNTY

/)#f

bQfifuts/Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LONIE PAULOS and ADVANCED
ORTHOPEDICS and SPORTS MEDICINE,
LLC, a Utah corporation,

RULING
CASE NO.

0609903698

Plaintiffs,
vs,
ALL MY SONS MOVING AND STORAGE, a
business entity, JOHN DOE, doing
business as All My Sons Moving and
Storage, and S&B STORAGE, a
business entity, and JOHN SIDDOWAY,
doing business as S&B STORAGE, and
JOHN DOES 1-10,
Defendants.

Plaintiffs7 Motion for New Trial comes before the Court pursuant to
Notice to Submit, dated January 25, 2008.
This Court denied the plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside pursuant to
Rule 60(b) by Minute Entry, dated January 7, 2008,
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for New Trial on January 11, 2008.

The

reasons submitted in support of said Motion are:
1

The Court's award of Judgment to the defendants, including

attorney's fees, is prejudicial to the plaintiff and his attorney.
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The failure of the plaintiff to appear in court for trial on

November 5, 2 007, was due to an honest mistake of Mr. Nemelka.
3

The Court made a mistake and signed the October 26, 2007,

Order prepared by Mr. Nemelka indicating that trial was scheduled for
November 6-8, 2007.
4

Plaintiff restates his argument that the Court's

decision

should have been set aside pursuant to Rule 6 0(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Mr. Nemelka and the plaintiff

state that their conduct

in not

appearing at trial on November 5, 2007, was unintentional.
There has been no allegation by anyone that the failure of the
plaintiff and counsel to be ready for trial at the time it was scheduled
was intentional, or that it was in bad faith.

The Court has made no

ruling that the plaintiff's case is without merit.

The fact is that

trial was set August 20, 2007,

in open court with Mr. Nemelka, Mr.

Spencer and Mr. Ludlow present.

It was set for November 5, 6, and 7,

2007.

The reason that trial was set on that date was that Mr. Nemelka

had filed a Motion asking for a new date from the previously set trial
date of October 15, so that he could attend and participate in the Utah
S^uamer Games in St. George, Utah, on the October date.

A-14
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PAULOS V. ALL MY SONS
MOVING AND STORAGE
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RULING

date was not a good date for Mr. Ludlow, who had to cancel his attendance
at a continuing legal education conference in order to be at trial, which
he did, rather than have trial set in 2008 which was the alternative.
The Order of October 26, 2007, which was prepared by Mr. Nemelka and
which he says the Court signed by mistake, does refer to trial commencing
on November 6, but this Order was not and never purported to be a
Scheduling Order, instead it was an Order allowing the plaintiff to
present evidence through deposition, rather than having a witness present
for trial.

In the best of all worlds, Mr. Nemelka's error of stating

that the trial was to commence on November 6 should have been corrected,
but that Order did not create confusion, nor did it change the trial date
which had been set for November 5.
On November 5, 2007, Mr. Spencer and Mr. Ludlow, their clients and
witnesses appeared, ready for trial at 9:00 a.m., at which time we
commenced a search for Mr. Nemelka and his client, and found out after
contacting his office that he was involved in trial in Bountiful, and we
learned -that he had mistakenly believed trial was supposed to commence
on November 6.

On the 5th in court, Mr. Spencer stated that he had had

a conversation with Mr. Nemelka the prior week in which he had informed
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PAULOS V. ALL MY SONS
MOVING AND STORAGE
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RULING

Mr. Nemelka that the trial was going to start on November 5 rather than
November 6, and that Mr. Nemelka7s belief that trial would start November
6 was mistaken.
Mr. Nemelka argues at length that the Court could have started trial
on November 6 with only relatively minor inconvenience to any of the
parties. What he doesn't say is that the dates November 5, 6 and 7 were
arrived at as the only three-day period the Court could accommodate
before sometime well into 2008, and that a three-day trial started on
November 6 could not have been completed that week.

It would have had

to be interrupted and couldn't have been finished for weeks.

The Court

had matters set November 8 ^nd 9 which couldn't be moved. Mr. Nemelka was
aware of this.
The only provision of Rule 59 which is relied upon by the plaintiff
and which could possibly apply to this Motion is Rule 59(a)(1):
"Irregularity in the proceedings of the court... or any order of the
court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from
having a fair trial."

There was no such irregularity in proceedings or

Court Order, and the plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial is denied, as is
the plaintiffs' Motion for an Order Staying
Disposition of Motion for New Trial.

the Judgment

Pending

I have known and respected Mr.

A-16
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PAULOS V. ALL MY SONS
MOVING AND STORAGE
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RULING

Nemelka for more than 30 years and empathize with his and the plaintiff's
situation, but there is no legal basis to grant his Motion for a New
Trial.
This is the final Order of the Court, no further Order need be
prepared by counsel.
Dated this

J/J

day of February, 2008.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Ruling, to the following, this^yjr>

Richard S. Nemelka
Stephen R. Nemelka
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
6806 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Stephen D. Spencer
Attorney for Defendant All My Sons Moving
45 E. Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Randy S. Ludlow
Attorney for Defendant Siddoway
185 S. State Street, Suite 208
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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day of February, 2008:

